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Abstract 
A Safety Risk Assessment is included in the 2014 Faculty Guidelines Institute (FGI) Guidelines for the Design and Construction 
of Hospitals and Outpatient Facilities, however, tools to support this requirement do not exist.  This paper presents continued 
development of a Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) toolkit to be used proactively during the design of healthcare facility projects. 
Following content development, the tool was tested at three project sites and through hypothetical scenarios in an interactive 
testing process engaging expert panels.  The testing revealed tactical considerations (content clarity, redundancy, etc.) and 
strategic aspects (themes related to use) for finalizing the tool. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference. 
Keywords: Paient safety; Health facility environment; Environment design; Risk management; Human factors ergonomics 
1. Introduction 
Improving safety is one of the most urgent issues facing healthcare. There has been an increasing focus on 
reducing adverse outcomes [1-5] and a growing awareness that the built environment plays a role in mitigating these 
conditions [6-11].  As one key component of the healthcare system, the physical environment interacts with other 
factors (e.g. organizational culture, operation) in complex ways impacting the risks of adverse events. While there is 
research surrounding the development of clinically-based safety protocols (e.g. surgical checklists), there is a 
paucity of published research that details the development of design tools used in healthcare facility design.  This 
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paper presents continued development of a Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) toolkit to be used proactively during the 
design of healthcare facility projects. As previously reported by Taylor et al. [12], the SRA tool has been developed 
using a consensus-based methodology with six expert workgroups.  Following content development, the tool has 
now been tested at three project sites and through several hypothetical scenarios in an interactive testing process 
engaging expert panels.  The study took a convergent mixed methods approach.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Testing the SRA using scenarios 
Scenarios can help prompt the decisions made during design and establish participant communication [13].   
However, the term scenario suffers from a lack of definition [14].  In this project, the scenarios were neither 
intended as “horizon planning” or methodological  tools for decision making by creating multiple futures for 
discussion [14, 15], nor to understand the specific tasks and work processes that should be supported [16, 17].  
Rather, as in some human computer interaction studies, the scenarios were used as a starting point for seminar 
activities, where it was left to the participants to decide how and how much to use the scenarios [13].    The seminar 
site used for testing was Kaiser Permanente’s (KP) Garfield Center for Innovation, described by KP as a living 
laboratory. The Garfield Center has several existing mockup spaces, such as patient rooms, an operating room, 
nursing stations, and outpatient clinics.  
For scenario testing the SRA, three setting types were envisioned for teams to use as part of the process. These 
included a meeting format, a low-fidelity mock-up (a room constructed of plywood with cardboard components [e.g. 
hand wash sink] and some furniture and equipment), and a high fidelity mock-up (rooms including final finishes, 
furniture, equipment, and non-functioning fixtures [e.g. sink, toilet]). The meeting format incorporated a unit 
renovation at a community hospital.  The low-fidelity mock-up was an Emergency Department (ED) exam room, 
where groups were encouraged to move objects and adjust the layout in any way they felt better addressed the SRA 
content.  The high-fidelity mockup scenarios used two existing patient rooms: an older version of a prior KP 
standard and a newer Labor and Delivery suite (LDR).  Due to the differences in the available high-fidelity spaces, 
two scenarios were developed, one for each room type. The older room standard incorporated a scenario of a short-
term oncology unit renovation. Teams were provided with a unit plan and instructed to consider safety-specific 
modifications that could serve as interim solutions while a new project was being designed.  The LDR room was 
used as a hypothetical benchmarking visit – allowing a design team to consider options they might want to 
incorporate into their own project. 
Plans were included as part of the evaluation package and demographic data were assembled from publicly 
available census records or town/city reports.  The considerations were printed on large format sheets (24” x 36”) 
and clipped to easels for the group to record their own notes. The content was not provided in advance of the 
sessions, but was the same for each of the group’s modules (i.e. the same falls and patient handling considerations 
were reviewed for each module and scenario).  
2.2. SRA testing using pilot site projects 
Additionally, projects were sought in in varied regions of the US and in different stages of the design process - 
block diagrams, schematic design and design development.  An opportunistic sample was selected: Barnes Jewish 
Hospital (BJH) in St. Louis, MO; the University of California Irvine Medical Center (UCI) in Irvine, CA; and the 
Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center (MSK) in New York, NY. Each used an oncology project to test the tool – 
one new construction and two renovations. One pilot site test was conducted prior to scenario testing, and two were 
conducted after the extensive feedback from the expert workgroups. Each pilot test included modifications based on 
prior test feedback. 
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2.3. Test participants 
All subject matter experts from Year 1 content development (criterion sample) were invited to participate in the 
Year 2 interactive testing seminar. Sixty-two percent of the Year 1 seminar participants returned.   Additional 
recruits (a convenience sample) included architects and designers who specialize in healthcare facility design, a 
category that had fewer participants in Year 1, due to the nature of the content development expertise.  Subject 
matter teams made up of up to eight experts were combined to address areas with the most overlapping interest (i.e. 
falls and patient handling; security and psychiatric/behavioral health injury).  At the pilot sites, there was a range of 
participant expertise, some specific to one of the risk categories (e.g. pharmacists/nursing for medication safety, 
epidemiologists for infection control). Selection was left to the pilot test organization, but suggestions for the types 
of people that might be engaged were provided.  
2.3.1. Data collection 
Scenario testing started with an orientation, followed by a series of test sessions where participants used the tool 
in the hypothetical scenario.  All teams started with the meeting format (Module A), and completed the high-fidelity 
(Module B) and low-fidelity (Module C) testing, as well as a module for considering dissemination (Module D), and 
an overall team debrief before concluding the event (Table 1). The order varied by topic, due to space limitations. 
Table 1. Testing sequence in varied scenario modules. 
Team SRA components/topics Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 
1 Falls/ Patient Handling (F/PH) Module A Module B Module D Module C Debrief 
2 Falls/ Patient Handling (F/PH) A B D C Debrief 
3 Psychiatric ((Behavioral Health) Injury/Security (BH/Sec) A C B D Debrief 
4 Psychiatric ((Behavioral Health) Injury/Security (BH/Sec) A C B D Debrief 
5 Healthcare-associated Infection/ Med Safety (HAI/MS) A D C B Debrief 
6 Healthcare-associated Infection/ Med Safety (HAI/MS) A D C B Debrief 
 
Each group focused on the same two assigned SRA components throughout the seminar to help evaluate usage of 
same tool within different design conditions and scenarios. The workgroup teams were instructed to complete as 
many considerations as possible in each topic area in approximately 35 minutes.  Returning participants were 
familiar with the content developed in the prior year, and all groups completed all considerations in all scenarios. 
At the pilot sites, each session included an orientation to the SRA project (remote or live), followed by testing 
where participants used the tool for their project.  Unlike the scenario testing with the expert workgroup teams, the 
pilot sites did not complete all topic areas or even all of the content in their selected categories.  As the first test site, 
the BJH team decided to allocate 20 minutes per section in order to complete as many of the topics as possible. This 
was feasible given the project phase (design development) where fewer decisions could be made and the tool 
became more of a validation instrument.  With the other pilot sites earlier in the design process, additional time for 
discussion was needed. Topics and completion rates for the pilot sites are summarized in Table 2.   
Table 2. Summary of Pilot Site Considerations (Completion and Time). 
Site and Design Phase UCI (Master Planning): 
n=13 
MSK (Schematic Design): n=15 BJH (Design Development):  
n=4 FT, 3 PT 
Topics covered and completion 
rate 
HAI (60% complete); 
Medication safety (60% 
complete) 
Falls (47% complete); Infection 
control (66% complete); 
Medication safety (61% complete) 
Falls; Infection control; Patient 
handling; Security (43% complete); 
Medication safety (86% complete) 
Scheduled time for tool use 3 hours 2.75 hours 1.75 hours 
Average time/ consideration 4 minutes 3 minutes 1 minute 
Time range for considerations 10 sec – 15 min 20 sec – 8 min 10 sec – 3 min 
 
UCI, the second pilot site, was the first test following the two-day Year 2 testing seminar, and some of the 
duplications and clarity were addressed prior to their “live” session.  In addition, similar considerations were 
grouped, based upon feedback from testing with the hypothetical scenarios.  The last pilot site (MSK) was facilitated 
139 Ellen Taylor et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  136 – 143 
by a researcher (ET), based upon feedback from the prior pilot tests.  Topics were integrated and the testing order 
was organized by levels of building design decision-making (e.g. unit layout, room layout). 
3. Results 
3.1. Qualitative analysis 
As part of a PhD thesis, qualitative coding was undertaken following the process of Miles et al. [18] and Corbin 
and Strauss [19].  These were categorized according to a previously reported literature review [12]: design culture 
(existing processes and users and design); the evidence base (using, managing, and sharing knowledge); and 
guidance needs.  The focus of this paper is on the guidance needs specific to the tool. 
3.1.1. Guidance needs 
Guidance needs most often centered on optimizing use of the tool, both tactical and strategic. The tactical 
considerations for improving the tool following scenario testing included eliminating content redundancy, reviewing 
the item order, and clarifying the rationale. Workgroup members provided specific suggestions including.  
 
? Other factors such as cultural issues and operational processes often impact safety. It might be helpful to provide 
a guide around the process including: the composition of SRA team (.g. subject-matter experts) and individuals’ 
responsibilities; the engagement of external facilitation services; connection to cultural and operational issues, 
especially other existing safety processes; the required information to serve as input to the SRA (such as risk 
evaluation); and how to address potential conflicts/trade-offs between components, etc. 
? The decision on adopting a design consideration would depend on an estimation of value versus cost as well as its 
relative priority among all considerations.  
? Design considerations addressing similar or closely relevant issues (e.g. design disciplines such as mechanical 
design) should be grouped together to make the tool easier to use. 
? For a specific project (e.g. the scenarios covering specific patient types), some design considerations might be 
irrelevant (i.e. N/A-not applicable). It would be ideal to be able to filter “N/A” considerations to avoid fatigue.  
? The results of the SRA might be the relative priority levels (e.g. high, medium, low) of design considerations 
instead of simple yes-no-maybe answers.  
? The rationale statements were useful but need revisions to further strengthen and clarify (e.g. references). 
? Simulated environment (i.e. mock-ups) helped to visualize spaces and could facilitate communication.  
? Definitions were needed for some terms especially for those not familiar with the subject. Some terminology 
might be considered outdated. 
? The tool would be helpful as a check-in across design phases. 
 
In addition, many testers commented that the SRA process could be a way to identify strategic priorities for the 
organization.  This in turn, would act as a filter for decision-making and inform any “value engineering” stage.  In 
suggestions for streamlining the process, the groups also referenced the need for an information hierarchy as a filter.  
For example, addressing the need for patient handling at an early phase (a macro issue), while considering grab bars 
at a later phase (a micro issue).  However, there was also an awareness of the need to balance a discussion of more 
detailed information that is often not considered until later in the process, when there is a negative budget 
implication.   
3.2. Survey results and comparisons 
Each group (scenario workgroups or pilot test participants) were given a Likert-scale survey following each use 
of the SRA tool, for example, after each scenario module, or after the pilot test.  The 5-point scale ranged from “1: 
Strongly Disagree” to “5: Strongly Agree.”  During the scenario testing, this survey was conducted online prior to 
the verbal debrief.  During the pilot tests, the participants completed a paper-based survey prior to the focus group 
debrief.  Six questions were common to all participants testing the SRA tool in scenarios and project tests. 
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Comparisons were made according to: each group that tested the SRA (i.e. six workgroups and three pilot sites); and 
combined setting types (three module types for scenarios and the pilot sites combined as “real world” module).  
Quantitative analysis using SPSS 22.0 [20] included descriptive statistics, tests for normality, and comparison of 
means, to evaluate whether there were similarities or differences in self-evaluated perceptions of using the tool. 
Because Shapiro Wilks tests for normality were violated in nearly all cases, comparing means by one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was inappropriate.  As a result, probability distributions of data were compared with non-
parametric tests for independent samples (Kruskal-Wallis H test) for the following: 
 
? H0: The probability distribution of the survey responses are the same across workgroups, pilots, or modules. 
? Ha: At least two of the workgroups (pilots/modules) have probability distributions of survey responses that differ. 
 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical testing.  Post hoc analysis was conducted for statistically 
significant results.  To control for experimental type-1 error (the probability of rejecting at least one pair hypothesis 
given all pairwise hypotheses are true), SPSS NPTESTS procedures adjust the p-values calculated and used for 
pairwise decisions.  These are adjusted as padj= pK(K-1)/2 using ranks based on considering all samples rather than 
just the two involved in a given comparison, as proposed for Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) testing in 1964 by Dunn [21].   
3.2.1. Enough Time 
The K-W test for “Enough Time” between the teams was significant χ2 (8, N = 137) = 23.038, p = .003, with a 
mean rank score for Team 1 (F/PH), 76.83, for Team 2 (F/PH), 82.42 for Team 3 (BH/Sec), 60.87 for Team 4 
(BH/Sec), 84.10 for Team 5 (HAI/MS), and 65.76, for Team 6 (HAI/MS), 66.03, for BJH, 45.00, for UCI, 37.42, 
and for MSK, 85.82. The proportion of variability in the ranked “Enough Time” scores accounted for 43.6 percent, 
indicating a moderately strong relationship.  Post hoc tests to evaluate pairwise differences among the teams 
indicated a significant difference between UCI and Team 2 (F/PH), padj =.042, UCI to 4: BH/Sec, padj =.018, and 
UCI to MSK, padj =.000.  There was also a significant difference between Team 3 (BH/Sec) and MSK, padj =.014.  
There were no other significant differences between the other team combinations.  
The K-W test for “Enough Time” between settings was significant χ2 (3, N = 137) = 11.506, p = .009, with a 
mean rank score for A: Meeting, 60.01; B: High-fidelity, 83.82; C: Low-fidelity, 73.89, and Pilots, 59.33. The 
proportion of variability in the ranked “Enough Time” scores accounted for 70.8 percent, indicating a strong 
relationship.  Post hoc tests to evaluate pairwise differences among the settings indicated a significant difference 
between B: High-fidelity and Pilots, padj =.028 and A: Meeting to B: High-fidelity, padj =.026.  There were no other 
significant differences between the other setting combinations. 
3.2.2. Guidance (through facilitation) 
The K-W test for “Guidance (facilitation)” between the teams was significant χ2 (8, N = 137) = 36.208, p = .000, 
with a mean rank score for Team 1 (F/PH), 59.50, for Team 2 (F/PH), 46.81 for Team 3 (BH/Sec), 84.30 for Team 4 
(BH/Sec), 57.23 for Team 5 (HAI/MS), and 60.27, for Team 6 (HAI/MS), 63.17, for BJH, 47.67, for UCI, 91.85, 
and for MSK, 109.21.  The proportion of variability in the ranked “Guidance (person)” scores accounted for 42.9 
percent, indicating a moderately strong relationship.  Post hoc tests were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences 
among the teams. Results indicated statistically significant differences between 1 (F/PH) to MSK, padj = .003; 2 
(F/PH) and MSK, padj = .000; 4 BH/Sec) to MSK, padj = .005; 5 (HAI/MS) to MSK, padj = .003, and 6 (HAI/MS) to 
MSK, padj = .015; and BJH and MSK, padj = .020.  (MSK was the only team that participated in a facilitated format.)  
There were no other significant differences between teams. 
The K-W test for “Guidance (facilitation)” between settings was significant χ2 (3, N = 137) = 18.553, p = .000, 
with a mean rank score of 63.33 for A; Meeting; 54.35 for B: High-fidelity; 68.42 for C: Low-fidelity; and 91.18 for 
Pilots.  The proportion of variability in the ranked “Guidance (facilitation)” scores accounted for 59.6 percent, 
indicating a strong relationship.  Post hoc tests were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among the pilot 
sites. Results indicated statistically significant differences between both B: high-fidelity and Pilots, padj = .000 and 
A: Meeting and Pilots, padj = .008.  There were no other significant differences between settings.   
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3.2.3. Guidance (content/rationale) 
The K-W test for “Guidance (content/rationale)” between the settings was significant χ2 (3, N = 136) = 9.984, p 
= .019, with a mean rank score of 57.81 for A: Meeting, 71.63 for B: High-fidelity, 62.94 for C: low-fidelity, and 
84.26 for Pilots. The proportion of variability in the ranked “Guidance (content/rationale)” scores accounted for 68.6 
percent, indicating a strong relationship.  Post hoc tests to evaluate pairwise differences among the settings indicated 
a significant difference between A; Meeting and Pilots, padj =.017.  There were no other significant differences 
between the setting combinations.   
The K-W test for “Guidance (content/rationale)” between the teams was significant χ2 (8, N = 136) = 39.379, p = 
.000, with a mean rank score Team 1 (F/PH), 69.19, for Team 2 (F/PH), 29.35 for Team 3 (BH/Sec), 40.07 for Team 
4 (BH/Sec), 75.97 for Team 5 (HAI/MS), and 78.11, for Team 6 (HAI/MS), 74.24, for BJH, 60.08, for UCI, 75.73, 
and for MSK, 105.58. The proportion of variability in the ranked “Guidance (content/rationale)” scores accounted 
for 27.8 percent, indicating a moderate relationship.  Post hoc tests were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences 
among the teams. Results indicated statistically significant differences between 2 (F/PH) and 5 (HAI/MS), padj = 
.005; 2 (F/PH) and 6 (HAI/MS), padj = .025; 2 and UCI, padj = .046; 2 to MSK, padj = .000; and 2 to 4 (BH/Sec), padj 
= .029.  There was also a significant difference between 3 (BH/Sec) and MSK, padj = .000.  There were no other 
significant differences between teams.  
3.2.4.  Easy to Use 
The K-W test for “Easy to Use” between the settings was significant χ2 (3, N = 136) = 10.256, p = .017, with a 
mean rank score of 56.88 for A: Meeting; 81.96 for B: High-fidelity; 63.73 for C: Low-fidelity; and 72.79 for Pilots.  
The proportion of variability in the ranked “Easy to Use” scores accounted for 69.4 percent, indicating a strong 
relationship.  Post hoc tests were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among the pilots. Statistically 
significant results were only found between A: Meeting and B: High-fidelity, padj = .014. There were no differences 
between the other combinations of settings. 
4. Discussion 
Overall, the testing of the SRA reveals significant opportunity for a proactive process that focuses on safety to 
positively affect the way healthcare facility design is approached.  The process offers a decision-making forum that 
balances needs and priorities and provides an opportunity for stakeholders to learn from each other’s perspectives.  
The use of knowledge is enhanced through the participation of experts and users who can challenge assumptions, 
share real-world experiences, and synthesize the types of information brought to the discussion.  There were few 
differences in coding between topics and settings, but there was significant variation by team, even within topic.  
Team composition (expertise and personality) must be considered to facilitate dialogue that informs the design 
process.  At a high level, there can be some generalizations between the qualitative coding and the quantitative 
analysis for topics, teams, and settings.  
4.1. Topics 
Established topics (such as infection control) may initially fare better in safety-focused discussions.  Areas of 
infection control and medication safety each have more of an evidence base in the form of available research, while 
security and psychiatric injury have much less published research and are more reliant on accepted guidelines. The 
evidence for falls lies in the middle, as the complexity of confounders and bundles of interventions can lead to a less 
than clear direction on optimum solutions.   
While this could not be compared specifically through the quantitative data, as topics were integrated during 
testing, it is interesting to note that there were statistically significant differences when comparing self-scoring for 
guidance through content and rationale by integrated topic.  During scenario testing, Falls/Patient Handling were 
generally lower as compared to Infection (HAI)/Medication Safety. This may be due, in part, to a higher level of 
familiarity of working with infection preventionists, as infection control has been included in the FGI Guidelines 
since 1996. Pharmacists have also been made increasingly aware of the influence of interruptions, distractions, noise 
and lighting on medication error as a result of the 2010 United States Pharmacopeial Convention’s National 
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Formulary, Chapter 1066:   Physical Environments that Promote Safe Medication Use. This difference may also be 
partially attributed to the use of tacit and explicit knowledge, where infection control and medication safety have 
made strides in explicit translation of the built environment issues through codes and guidelines, as compared to 
falls, which may have more reliance on the tacit knowledge of individual experiences.  
Testing indicated that there is integration of safety topics that can occur as part of the process.  This is important 
to understand the tradeoffs that may need to be considered through the perspective of different safety topics, as well 
as the ability to develop solutions that may simultaneously address more than one problem. 
4.2. Settings 
Quantitative analysis indicates that settings influence the perceived time to complete the SRA process. This was 
exhibited in the scenarios (less perceived time in Module A; Meeting as compared to Module B: High-fidelity), as 
well as in the combined results (less perceived time in Module A; Meeting as compared to Module B: High-fidelity 
and less perceived time in the pilots as compared to B: High-fidelity). Statistically significant differences indicated 
the ease of use during scenario testing was also perceived as better in Module B: High-fidelity setting as compared 
to Module A: meeting. The potential perception that there was “less to decide” in the two high-fidelity mockups 
may have influenced the evaluation of time and ease of use. It was evident from observing different phases at the 
pilot sites, that there are limited conversations once a decision has been made. With each increasing round of what 
may be perceived as a “finished” product (e.g. a professional rendering, a high-fidelity mockup), there is less need to 
question what was previously discussed. 
4.3. Teams 
The qualitative analysis indicated the benefit of multi-disciplinary of transdisciplinary teams. This is supported 
by the quantitative analysis of self-evaluation, in which there were statistically significant differences found between 
the teams in several categories. There were statistically significant differences between the teams in the perception 
of enough time for testing, but it was not consistent for any one team to another. For example, this difference was 
present between Teams 2 (F/PH), 4 (BH/Sec), MSK and UCI, as well as between Team 3 (BH/Sec) and MSK.   
A consistent difference between teams occurred in the self-scoring for Guidance (content/rationale) (Team 2: 
Falls/Patient Handling self-scored lower than nearly every other team (3, 4, 5, 6, UCI, MSK).  This may be an 
indicator that the quality of discussions will be based upon the individuals selected to participate, rather than a sole 
reliance on the information included in the tool itself.  However, the process provides a systematic approach that 
could better enable informed discussions even if the group composition is suboptimal.   
Lastly, there were statistically significant differences in Guidance (through facilitation), where MSK self-scored 
higher than nearly all other teams (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, BJH).   MSK was the only fully facilitated site.  Based upon 
observation and participation, having someone familiar with the content and intent has a significant effect on the 
ability to navigate the considerations.  The caveat is that a facilitator needs to understand where an organic 
conversation is constructive to the process, rather than diverting the group. 
5. Conclusion 
For many, the SRA process offered a value proposition to not only improve the design, but foster a culture of 
safety within the organization and build consensus; however, the SRA will only be as effective as the effort put in. 
As one participant stated, “Sometimes it's easier to meet the prescriptive, but miss the intent.”  Leadership must 
promote/allow participation and participants must be interested and engaged to minimize a siloed and reactive 
approach.  
The qualitative and quantitative analysis confirms that the SRA tool can be used in a variety of ways to focus 
teams on the issues of safety in healthcare facility design.   As such, this toolkit may also serve to proactively 
advance HFE knowledge of “the environment of the environment” for HFE specialists that may be involved in 
health care facility design.  As with many practices that become institutionalized, there is always a danger of misuse, 
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however, once fully developed and implemented, the tool will be a significant step forward in enhancing patient and 
staff safety through reducing adverse physical environment latent conditions that are built into facilities during the 
planning, design, and construction of healthcare facilities.     
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